Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic'' and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description-1'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

29 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
9821 A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9585 Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17446 Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
9582 Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9586 In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9580 Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
9589 Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
9577 The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9578 If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
21710 We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
8854 My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9581 Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9579 Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
9587 How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9583 Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
9584 Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]